dc.contributor.author | Haslanger, Sally | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-06T19:18:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-06T19:18:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2168-9105 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116159 | |
dc.description.abstract | Racism, sexism, and other forms of injustice are more than just bad attitudes; after all, such injustice involves unfair distributions of goods and resources. But attitudes play a role. How central is that role? Tommie Shelby, among others, argues that racism is an ideology and takes a cognitivist approach suggesting that ideologies consist in false beliefs that arise out of and serve pernicious social conditions. In this paper I argue that racism is better understood as a set of practices, attitudes, social meanings, and material conditions, that systematically reinforce one another. Attitudes play a role, but even the cognitive/affective component of ideologies should include culturally shared habits of mind and action. These habits of mind distort, obscure, and occlude important facts about subordinated groups and result in a failure to recognize their interests. How do we disrupt such practices to achieve greater justice? I argue that this is sometimes, but not always, best achieved by argument or challenging false beliefs, so social movements legitimately seek other means. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Res Philosophica | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1547 | en_US |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
dc.source | MIT Web Domain | en_US |
dc.title | Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Haslanger, Sally. “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.” Res Philosophica 94, 1 (2017): 1–22 © 2017 Sally Haslanger | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Haslanger, Sally | |
dc.relation.journal | Res Philosophica | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dc.date.updated | 2018-05-11T16:33:15Z | |
dspace.orderedauthors | Haslanger, Sally | en_US |
dspace.embargo.terms | N | en_US |
mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |