Reply to Fine on Aboutness

Author(s)
Yablo, Stephen
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Abstract
A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first.
Date issued
2017-05
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/116361
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Yablo, Stephen. “Reply to Fine on Aboutness.” Philosophical Studies 175, no. 6 (May 29, 2017): 1495–1512.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0031-8116
1573-0883
Keywords
Meaning, Truth, Metaphysics, Intentionality, Propositions
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