The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption
Author(s)
Anderson, Ross; Bellovin, Steven M.; Benaloh, Josh; Blaze, Matt; Diffie, Whitfeld; Gilmore, John; Neumann, Peter G.; Schneier, Bruce; Abelson, Harold; Rivest, Ronald L; Schiller, Jeffrey I; ... Show more Show less
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Show full item recordAbstract
A variety of "key recovery," "key escrow," and "trusted third-party" encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environments brought about by new technologies. This report
examines the fundamental properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks, costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to encryption keys.
Date issued
1997-06Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Information Services and Technology; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Computer ScienceJournal
World Wide Web Journal
Publisher
O'Reilly & Associates, Inc
Citation
Abelson, Hal et al. "The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption." World Wide Web Journal 2, 3 (1997): 241-257
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
1085-2301