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Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

Author(s)
Robinson, James A.; Verdier, Thierry; Acemoglu, K. Daron
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.

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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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Abstract
We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more “cuddly” form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.
Date issued
2017-10
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118645
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier. “Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World.” Journal of Political Economy 125, no. 5 (October 2017): 1245–1305.
Version: Final published version
ISSN
0022-3808
1537-534X

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