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dc.contributor.authorVavrek, Jayson Robert
dc.contributor.authorHenderson, Brian Scott
dc.contributor.authorDanagoulian, Areg
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-17T15:53:44Z
dc.date.available2018-12-17T15:53:44Z
dc.date.issued2018-04
dc.date.submitted2017-12
dc.identifier.issn0027-8424
dc.identifier.issn1091-6490
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119658
dc.description.abstractFuture nuclear arms reduction efforts will require technologies to verify that warheads slated for dismantlement are authentic without revealing any sensitive weapons design information to international inspectors. Despite several decades of research, no technology has met these requirements simultaneously. Recent work by Kemp et al. [Kemp RS, Danagoulian A, Macdonald RR, Vavrek JR (2016) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 113:8618–8623] has produced a novel physical cryptographic verification protocol that approaches this treaty verification problem by exploiting the isotope-specific nature of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements to verify the authenticity of a warhead. To protect sensitive information, the NRF signal from the warhead is convolved with that of an encryption foil that contains key warhead isotopes in amounts unknown to the inspector. The convolved spectrum from a candidate warhead is statistically compared against that from an authenticated template warhead to determine whether the candidate itself is authentic. Here we report on recent proof-of-concept warhead verification experiments conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, we measured NRF spectra from the interrogation of proxy “genuine” and “hoax” objects by a 2.52 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung beam. The observed differences in NRF intensities near 2.2 MeV indicate that the physical cryptographic protocol can distinguish between proxy genuine and hoax objects with high confidence in realistic measurement times.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipUnited States. National Nuclear Security Administration (award DE-NA0002534)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipStanton Foundation. Nuclear Security Fellowship Programen_US
dc.publisherProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1721278115en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourcePNASen_US
dc.titleExperimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescenceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationVavrek, Jayson R., Brian S. Henderson, and Areg Danagoulian. “Experimental Demonstration of an Isotope-Sensitive Warhead Verification Technique Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 17 (April 10, 2018): 4363–4368.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineeringen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Physicsen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorVavrek, Jayson Robert
dc.contributor.mitauthorHenderson, Brian Scott
dc.contributor.mitauthorDanagoulian, Areg
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2018-12-04T15:47:25Z
dspace.orderedauthorsVavrek, Jayson R.; Henderson, Brian S.; Danagoulian, Aregen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-6809-9380
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9133-5559
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-5178-1108
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US


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