Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach
Author(s)
Fudenberg, Drew; Imhof, Lorens A.; Ellison, Glenn David
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Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence” to a set A if the models both reach A quickly and leave A slowly, where “quickly” and “slowly” refer to whether the expected hitting and exit times remain bounded when N tends to infinity. We provide simple and general Lyapunov criteria which are sufficient for reaching quickly and leaving slowly. We use these criteria to determine aspects of learning models that promote fast convergence.
Date issued
2015-11Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of EconomicsJournal
Journal of Economic Theory
Citation
Ellison, Glenn, Drew Fudenberg, and Lorens A. Imhof. “Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Models: A Lyapunov Approach.” Journal of Economic Theory 161 (January 2016): 1–36.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0022-0531