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dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorKamada, Yuichiro
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-25T20:06:28Z
dc.date.available2019-11-25T20:06:28Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.date.submitted2017-01
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123086
dc.description.abstractMany models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show that every heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player. Keywords: Rationalizability; Extensive-form games; Self-confirming equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Purification; Random matchingen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (Grant SES-0646816)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (Grant SES-0951462)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (Grant SES-1258665)en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs Licenseen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceProf. Fudenberg via Nick Albaughen_US
dc.titleRationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationFudenberg, Drew and Yuichiro Kamada. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs." Games and Economic Behavior 109 (May 2018): 364-381 © 2018 Elsevier Incen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.approverFudenberg, Drewen_US
dc.relation.journalGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.date.submission2019-11-13T19:33:36Z
mit.journal.volume109en_US
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY


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