Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions
Author(s)
Stalnaker, Robert
DownloadAccepted version (94.91Kb)
Terms of use
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
One standard way of approaching the problem of analyzing conditional sentences begins with the
assumption that a sentence of this kind expresses a proposition that is a function of the
propositions expressed by its component parts (plus, perhaps, some features of the context in
which the sentence is uttered). The task is to characterize this function. But there is also a long
tradition according to which conditional sentences – at least some conditional sentences – are
used to perform a special kind of speech act. A conditional assertion is not a standard kind of
speech act (assertion) with a distinctive kind of content (a conditional proposition), but rather a
distinctive kind of speech act that involves just the two propositions, the ones expressed by the
antecedent and the consequent. There has been considerable controversy about which of these
two strategies for explaining conditionals is better. Keyword: conditionals; assertion; truth-conditions; propositions
Date issued
2011Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyJournal
Epistemic Modality
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Citation
Stalnaker, Robert. "Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions." Epistemic modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. Oxford University Press, 2011: 227-247 © 2011 The Author.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISBN
9780199591596
ISSN
9780191729027