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dc.contributor.authorVasserman, Shoshana
dc.contributor.authorYildiz, Muhamet
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-04T20:07:49Z
dc.date.available2020-05-04T20:07:49Z
dc.date.issued2019-04
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261
dc.identifier.issn1756-2171
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125000
dc.description.abstractWe develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12273en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceother univ websiteen_US
dc.titlePretrial negotiations under optimismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationVasserman, Shoshana, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Pretrial Negotiations under Optimism.” The RAND Journal of Economics 50, 2 (June 2019): 359–90.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.relation.journalRAND Journal of Economicsen_US
dc.eprint.versionOriginal manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2019-10-23T16:43:40Z
dspace.date.submission2019-10-23T16:43:44Z
mit.journal.volume50en_US
mit.journal.issue2en_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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