Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan
Author(s)
Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Enikolopov, Ruben![Thumbnail](/bitstream/handle/1721.1/127650/Fotini_Direct%20democracy.pdf.jpg?sequence=4&isAllowed=y)
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Direct democracy is designed to better align policy outcomes with citizen preferences. To test this proposition, we randomized whether 250 villages across Afghanistan selected projects by secret-ballot referenda or by consultation meetings. We find that referenda reduce the influence of local elites over both project type and location. Consistent with previous experimental results, we also find that referenda improve villagers' perceptions of the local economy and of the quality of local governance. However, we find no systematic evidence that selecting projects via referenda increases the average impact of such projects.
Date issued
2017-01Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political ScienceJournal
Journal of Development Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Citation
Beath, Andrew et al. "Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan." Journal of Development Economics 124 (January 2017): 199-213 © 2016 Elsevier B.V.
Version: Original manuscript
ISSN
0304-3878