Rents and economic development: the perspective of Why Nations Fail
Author(s)
Acemoglu, K. Daron; Robinson, James A.
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We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’. ©2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
Date issued
2019-03Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of EconomicsJournal
Public Choice
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, "Rents and economic development: the perspective of Why Nations Fail." Public Choice 181, 1/2 (October 2019): 13–28 doi. 10.1007/s11127-019-00645-z ©2019 Authors
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
1573-7101