Riffle: An Efficient Communication System With Strong Anonymity
Name
[22990984 - Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies] Riffle.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
2.08 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
d3d9e79aaded2efbec4126bb93446f36
Author(s)
Kwon, Albert Hyukjae
Lazar, David
Devadas, Srinivas
Ford, Bryan
Date Issued
December 2015
Journal
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Citation
Kwon, Albert Hyukjae et al. "Riffle: An Efficient Communication System With Strong Anonymity." Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016, 2 (April 2016): 115-134
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Existing anonymity systems sacrifice anonymity for efficient communication or vice-versa. Onion-routing achieves low latency, high bandwidth, and scalable anonymous communication, but is susceptible to traffic analysis attacks. Designs based on DC-Nets, on the other hand, protect the users against traffic analysis attacks, but sacrifice bandwidth. Verifiable mixnets maintain strong anonymity with low bandwidth overhead, but suffer from high computation overhead instead. In this paper, we present Riffle, a bandwidth and computation efficient communication system with strong anonymity. Riffle consists of a small set of anonymity servers and a large number of users, and guarantees anonymity among all honest clients as long as there exists at least one honest server. Riffle uses a new hybrid verifiable shuffle technique and private information retrieval for bandwidth- and computation-efficient anonymous communication. Our evaluation of Riffle in file sharing and microblogging applications shows that Riffle can achieve a bandwidth of over 100KB/s per user in an anonymity set of 200 users in the case of file sharing, and handle over 100,000 users with less than 10 second latency in the case of microblogging.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1515/popets-2016-0008
