Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGoldwasser, Shafrira
dc.contributor.authorPark, Sunoo
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-13T20:33:02Z
dc.date.available2021-01-13T20:33:02Z
dc.date.issued2017-10
dc.identifier.isbn9781450351751
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129411
dc.description.abstract“Our Laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know.” —Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes. Post 9/11, journalists, scholars and activists have pointed out that it secret laws - a body of law whose details and sometime mere existence is classified as top secret - were on the rise in all three branches of the US government due to growing national security concerns. Amid heated current debates on governmental wishes for exceptional access to encrypted digital data, one of the key issues is: which mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that government agencies follow agreed-upon rules in a manner which does not compromise national security objectives? This promises to be especially challenging when the rules, according to which access to encrypted data is granted, may themselves be secret. In this work we show how the use of cryptographic protocols, and in particular, the idea of zero knowledge proofs can ensure accountability and transperancy of the government in this extraordinary, seemingly deadlocked, setting. We propose an efficient record-keeping infrastructure with versatile publicly verifiable audits that preserve (information-theoretic) privacy of record contents as well as of the rules by which the records are attested to abide. Our protocol is based on existing blockchain and cryptographic tools including commitments and zero-knowledge SNARKs, and satisfies the properties of indelibility (i.e., no back-dating), perfect data privacy, public auditability of secret data with secret laws, accountable deletion, and succinctness. We also propose a variant scheme where entities can be required to pay fees based on record contents (e.g., for violating regulations) while still preserving privacy. Our scheme can be directly instantiated on the Ethereum blockchain (and a simplified version with weaker guarantees can be instantiated with Bitcoin).en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNSF (Grant MACS - CNS-1413920)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipDARPA (Grant IBM - W911NF-15-C-0236)en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3139550.3139565en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceOther repositoryen_US
dc.titlePublic Accountability vs. Secret Laws: Can They Coexist?: A Cryptographic Proposalen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationGoldwasser, Shafi and Sunoo Park. "Public Accountability vs. Secret Laws: Can They Coexist?: A Cryptographic Proposal." Proceedings of the 2017 on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, October 2017, Dallas, Texas,Association for Computing Machinery, 2017. © 2017 The Authoren_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratoryen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.relation.journalProceedings of the 2017 on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Societyen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2019-05-29T15:54:01Z
dspace.date.submission2019-05-29T15:54:02Z
mit.metadata.statusComplete


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record