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dc.contributor.authorSpencer, Jack
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-17T13:55:01Z
dc.date.available2021-03-17T13:55:01Z
dc.date.issued2019-12
dc.date.submitted2019-10
dc.identifier.issn0026-4423
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130152
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value.en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1093/MIND/FZZ070en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleObjective Value Is Always Newcombizableen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAhmed, Arif and Jack Spencer. “Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable.” Mind, 129, 516 ( 2019): 1157-1192 © 2019 The Author(s)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.journalMinden_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2021-03-12T18:58:19Z
dspace.orderedauthorsAhmed, A; Spencer, Jen_US
dspace.date.submission2021-03-12T18:58:20Z
mit.journal.volume129en_US
mit.journal.issue516en_US
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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