| dc.contributor.author | Levine, Sydney | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kleiman-Weiner, Max | |
| dc.contributor.author | Schulz, Laura E | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tenenbaum, Joshua B | |
| dc.contributor.author | Cushman, Fiery | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-29T19:36:37Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-03-29T19:36:37Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-10 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-07 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0027-8424 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1091-6490 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130261 | |
| dc.description.abstract | To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say, "What if everybody did that?" In other words, even if a single person's behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized.We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative models. We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universalization, and report comparable patterns of judgment in children. We conclude that, alongside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thinking, the logic of universalizing holds an important place in our moral minds. | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | John Templeton Foundation (Grant 61061) | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | NSF (Award CCF-1231216) | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | National Academy of Sciences | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014505117 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. | en_US |
| dc.source | PNAS | en_US |
| dc.title | The logic of universalization guides moral judgment | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Levine, Sydney et al. "The logic of universalization guides moral judgment." 117, 42 (October 2020): 26158-26169 © 2020 National Academy of Sciences | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2021-03-19T12:34:28Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Levine, S; Kleiman-Weiner, M; Schulz, L; Tenenbaum, J; Cushman, F | en_US |
| dspace.date.submission | 2021-03-19T12:34:29Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 117 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 42 | en_US |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_POLICY | |
| mit.metadata.status | Complete | |