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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, K. Daron
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-01T14:01:12Z
dc.date.available2021-04-01T14:01:12Z
dc.date.issued2020-07
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130323
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates whether information about improved public services can help build trust in state institutions and move people away from nonstate actors. We find that (truthful) information about reduced delays in state courts in rural Pakistan leads to citizens reporting higher likelihood of using them and to greater allocations to the state in high-stakes lab games. We also find negative indirect effects on nonstate actors and show that these changes are a response to improved beliefs about state actors, which make individuals interact less with nonstate actors and, we argue, induce them to downgrade their beliefs about these actors.en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1086/707765en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceUniversity of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.titleTrust in State and Nonstate Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistanen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAcemoglu, Daron et al. “Trust in State and Nonstate Actors: Evidence from Dispute Resolution in Pakistan.” The Journal of Political Economy, 128, 8 (July 2020): 3090-3147 © 2020 The Author(s)en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.relation.journalThe Journal of Political Economyen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2021-03-29T17:42:47Z
dspace.orderedauthorsAcemoglu, D; Cheema, A; Khwaja, AI; Robinson, JAen_US
dspace.date.submission2021-03-29T17:42:48Z
mit.journal.volume128en_US
mit.journal.issue8en_US
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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