Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment
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We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment. (JEL C92, D82, D83)
Date issued
2019-11Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of EconomicsJournal
AEJ: Macroeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Fudenberg, Drew and Emanuel Vespa. “Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment.” AEJ: Macroeconomics, 11, 4 (November 2020): 186-215 © 2020 The Author(s)
Version: Final published version
ISSN
1945-7715