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dc.contributor.authorRahmandad, Hazhir
dc.contributor.authorTon, Zeynep
dc.date.accessioned2021-04-08T19:26:59Z
dc.date.available2021-04-08T19:26:59Z
dc.date.issued2020-02
dc.date.submitted2018-09
dc.identifier.issn1047-7039
dc.identifier.issn1526-5455
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130419
dc.description.abstractSeveral case studies suggest that firms targeting mass market services can align profitability with jobs offering a living wage, stable schedules, and engaging work. Yet, few do. To understand this puzzle, we draw on theories of firms as systems of interdependent choices. Building on a few cases, we map the processes connecting managerial choice to performance and formalize the resulting performance landscape. In a strategy space defined by two dimensions-task richness and compensation-two local profitability peaks emerge: one with low compensation and low task richness and one with high compensation and high task richness. The bimodal landscape results from complementarity among choices and is robust when the strategy space is expanded from two to six dimensions and under many alternative parameterizations. Exploring how firms discover, move to, and remain at the high-compensation-high-task richness peak, we find three challenges to this strategy: (a) contextuality-adoption, imitation, and replication are harder for strategies that rely on interdependences among components and thus, require significant customization for each context; (b) temporal complexity-strategies depending on long-term and synergistic investments and slow-moving reinforcing feedbacks are hard to learn owing to misleading performance feedback; and (c) variable demand with no inventory buffers-efforts to adjust labor supply to highly variable demand in services often lead to unstable schedules given with short notice that drive quality employees away and compromise the strategy. These mechanisms can undermine promising strategies even if the actual performance landscape includes a small number of local peaks.en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1287/ORSC.2019.1347en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSSRNen_US
dc.titleIf Higher Pay Is Profitable, Why Is It So Rare? Modeling Competing Strategies in Mass Market Servicesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationRahmandad, Hazhir and Zeynep Ton. "If Higher Pay Is Profitable, Why Is It So Rare? Modeling Competing Strategies in Mass Market Services." Organization Science 31, 5 (February 2020): 1053-1312 © 2020 INFORMSen_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.relation.journalOrganization Scienceen_US
dc.eprint.versionOriginal manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2021-04-08T14:00:04Z
dspace.orderedauthorsRahmandad, H; Ton, Zen_US
dspace.date.submission2021-04-08T14:00:05Z
mit.journal.volume31en_US
mit.journal.issue5en_US
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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