| dc.contributor.author | Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-04-12T14:43:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-04-12T14:43:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-05 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-09 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0012-9682 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130444 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | The Econometric Society | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.3982/ECTA16680 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
| dc.title | The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Deb, Joyee et al. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching.” Econometrica, 88, 3 (May 2020): 917-964 © 2020 The Author(s) | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Econometrica | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Original manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2021-04-06T14:20:39Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Deb, J; Sugaya, T; Wolitzky, A | en_US |
| dspace.date.submission | 2021-04-06T14:20:40Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 88 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 3 | en_US |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed | |
