A Market-Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities
Author(s)
Kilenthong, Weerachart T.; Townsend, Robert
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In economies with a continuum of agents of different types, pecuniary externalities are removed with market exchanges. Agents choose from among various possible prices they want to prevail in the future and buy or sell rights in these market exchanges for future trade. Each agent can choose the exchange it wants without regard to what any other agent is doing. But crucially, the right to trade in each and every exchange is priced. The fee structure has a per-unit price and quantity decomposition: a price, as determined by the exchange chosen, times the quantity of rights acquired.
Date issued
2021-03Department
Sloan School of ManagementJournal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Kilenthong, Weerachart T. and Robert M. Townsend. "A Market-Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities." Journal of Political Economy 129, 4 (April 2021): 981-1010. © 2021 The University of Chicago
Version: Final published version
ISSN
0022-3808
1537-534X