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(Efficient) Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer Using a Minimal Number of Stateless Tokens
| dc.contributor.author | Choi, Seung G | |
| dc.contributor.author | Katz, Jonathan | |
| dc.contributor.author | Schröder, Dominique | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yerukhimovich, Arkady | |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhou, Hong-Sheng | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-20T17:17:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-09-20T17:17:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-03-23 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/131493 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Abstract We continue the line of work initiated by Katz (Eurocrypt 2007) on using tamper-proof hardware tokens for universally composable secure computation. As our main result, we show an oblivious-transfer (OT) protocol in which two parties each create and transfer a single, stateless token and can then run an unbounded number of OTs. We also show a more efficient protocol, based only on standard symmetric-key primitives (block ciphers and collision-resistant hash functions), that can be used if a bounded number of OTs suffice. Motivated by this result, we investigate the number of stateless tokens needed for universally composable OT. We prove that our protocol is optimal in this regard for constructions making black-box use of the tokens (in a sense we define). We also show that nonblack-box techniques can be used to obtain a construction using only a single stateless token. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer US | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-018-9288-x | en_US |
| dc.rights | Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. | en_US |
| dc.source | Springer US | en_US |
| dc.title | (Efficient) Universally Composable Oblivious Transfer Using a Minimal Number of Stateless Tokens | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2020-09-24T21:21:56Z | |
| dc.language.rfc3066 | en | |
| dc.rights.holder | International Association for Cryptologic Research | |
| dspace.embargo.terms | Y | |
| dspace.date.submission | 2020-09-24T21:21:56Z | |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_POLICY | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed |
