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dc.contributor.authorSeligson, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorMcCants, Anne EC
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-27T20:23:51Z
dc.date.available2021-10-27T20:23:51Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135530
dc.description.abstractWe can all agree that institutions matter, though as to which institutions matter most, and how much any of them matter, the matter is, paraphrasing Douglass North's words at the Nobel podium, unresolved after seven decades of immense effort. We suggest that the obstacle to progress is the paradigm of the New Institutional Economics itself. In this paper, we propose a new theory that is: grounded in institutions as coevolving sources of economic growth rather than as rules constraining growth; and deployed in dynamical systems theory rather than game theory. We show that with our approach some long-standing problems are resolved, in particular, the paradoxical and perplexingly pervasive influence of informal constraints on the long-run character of economies.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press (CUP)
dc.relation.isversionof10.1017/S1744137420000600
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceCambridge University Press
dc.titleCoevolving institutions and the paradox of informal constraints
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Physics
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. History Section
dc.relation.journalJournal of Institutional Economics
dc.eprint.versionFinal published version
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed
dc.date.updated2021-03-24T16:20:20Z
dspace.orderedauthorsSeligson, D; McCants, AEC
dspace.date.submission2021-03-24T16:20:21Z
mit.journal.volume17
mit.journal.issue3
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Needed


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