| dc.contributor.author | Spencer, Jack | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-12T17:19:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-08-12T17:19:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144348 | |
| dc.description.abstract | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.</jats:p> | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1093/ANALYS/ANAA037 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
| dc.title | An argument against causal decision theory | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Spencer, Jack. 2021. "An argument against causal decision theory." Analysis, 81 (1). | |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | |
| dc.relation.journal | Analysis | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-08-12T17:08:57Z | |
| dspace.orderedauthors | Spencer, J | en_US |
| dspace.date.submission | 2022-08-12T17:08:58Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 81 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 1 | en_US |
| mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | |
| mit.metadata.status | Authority Work and Publication Information Needed | en_US |
