Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia

Author(s)
Balboni, Clare; Burgess, Robin; Heil, Anton; Old, Jonathan; Olken, Benjamin A
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Abstract
<jats:p> This paper examines the link between electoral incentives and environmental degradation by exploiting a satellite dataset on 107,000 forest fires and 879 asynchronous district elections in Indonesia. Fires represent a cheap but illegal means of converting forested land to other uses, but they risk burning out of control and creating substantial negative environmental externalities. We find a significant electoral cycle in forest fires. Ignitions and area burned decline during election years but steeply increase in the year after. The results suggest that politicians may suppress this activity at times when it might particularly dent their electoral chances. </jats:p>
Date issued
2021
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144446
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Journal
American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Balboni, Clare, Burgess, Robin, Heil, Anton, Old, Jonathan and Olken, Benjamin A. 2021. "Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia." American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 111.
Version: Final published version
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