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dc.contributor.authorAbdulkadiroǧlu, Atila
dc.contributor.authorChe, Yeon-Koo
dc.contributor.authorPathak, Parag A
dc.contributor.authorRoth, Alvin E
dc.contributor.authorTercieux, Olivier
dc.date.accessioned2022-08-30T16:00:12Z
dc.date.available2022-08-30T16:00:12Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145198
dc.description.abstract<jats:p> Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. (JEL C78, D61) </jats:p>en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1257/AERI.20190307en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.titleEfficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matchingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAbdulkadiroǧlu, Atila, Che, Yeon-Koo, Pathak, Parag A, Roth, Alvin E and Tercieux, Olivier. 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching." American Economic Review: Insights, 2 (4).
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Review: Insightsen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2022-08-30T15:53:22Z
dspace.orderedauthorsAbdulkadiroǧlu, A; Che, Y-K; Pathak, PA; Roth, AE; Tercieux, Oen_US
dspace.date.submission2022-08-30T15:53:23Z
mit.journal.volume2en_US
mit.journal.issue4en_US
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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