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dc.contributor.authorRosenzweig, Leah R.
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Nicole E.
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-31T13:09:50Z
dc.date.available2022-10-31T13:09:50Z
dc.date.issued2022-10-29
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/146049
dc.description.abstractAbstract Governments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity toward the government, or identification with the nation. Instead, we find that willingness to pay taxes is correlated with group membership, believing that community members respect taxpayers, and donating to the community. Our data suggest that local institutions and social relations are associated with citizens’ willingness to comply with tax policy.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer USen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-022-09369-6en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attributionen_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSpringer USen_US
dc.titleState of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos’ Informal Settlementsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationRosenzweig, Leah R. and Wilson, Nicole E. 2022. "State of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos’ Informal Settlements."
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.mitlicensePUBLISHER_CC
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2022-10-30T04:19:38Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)
dspace.embargo.termsN
dspace.date.submission2022-10-30T04:19:38Z
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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