Partial grounding, identity, and nothing-over-and-aboveness

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently argued for acknowledging non-augmented partial grounds, partial grounds that are not parts of full grounds. This paper shows how non-augmented partial grounds can be straightforwardly modelled within the framework of generalised identity. I argue that my proposal answers questions concerning the connections between partial grounding, full grounding, and nothing-over-and-aboveness in a motivated way. In this context, I propose and discuss a way to spell out nothing-over-and-aboveness in terms of generalised identity that does justice to the claim that the fully grounded is nothing over and above its full grounds. It will turn out that the related question whether partial grounding and nothing-over-and-aboveness yield full grounding pertains to considerations concerning how finely factual content is individuated. The relationship between non-augmented partial grounding and nothing-over-and-aboveness crucially depends on whether one works with a representational or a worldly notion of grounding and how coarsely grained one takes worldly grounds to be.