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dc.contributor.authorAshok, Maitreyi
dc.contributor.authorMaji, Saurav
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Xin
dc.contributor.authorCohn, John
dc.contributor.authorChandrakasan, Anantha P
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-26T14:47:37Z
dc.date.available2024-04-26T14:47:37Z
dc.date.issued2024-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/154299
dc.description2024 IEEE Custom Integrated Circuits Conference April 21st – 24th, 2024 Denver, CO U.S.en_US
dc.description.abstractMachine learning (ML) accelerators provide energy efficient neural network (NN) implementations for applications such as speech recognition and image processing. Recently, digital IMC has been proposed to reduce data transfer energy, while still allowing for higher bitwidths and accuracies necessary for many workloads, especially with technology scaling [1,2]. Privacy of ML workloads can be exploited with physical side-channel attacks (SCAs) or bus probing attacks (BPAs) [3] (Fig. 1). While SCAs correlate IC power consumption or EM emissions to data or operations, BPAs directly tap traces between the IC and off-chip memory. The inputs reflect private data collected on IoT devices, such as images of faces. The weights, typically stored off-chip, reveal information about proprietary private training datasets. This work presents the first IMC macro protected against SCAs and BPAs to mitigate these risks.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (NSF)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, MathWorks Engineering Fellowshipen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-ShareAlikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceAuthoren_US
dc.titleA Secure Digital In-Memory Compute (IMC) Macro with Protections for Side-Channel and Bus Probing Attacksen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAshok, Maitreyi, Maji, Saurav, Zhang, Xin, Cohn, John and Chandrakasan, Anantha P. 2024. "A Secure Digital In-Memory Compute (IMC) Macro with Protections for Side-Channel and Bus Probing Attacks."
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dspace.date.submission2024-04-26T00:43:07Z
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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