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dc.contributor.authorMollahosseini, Poorya
dc.contributor.authorAfzal, Sayed Saad
dc.contributor.authorAdib, Fadel
dc.contributor.authorGhasempour, Yasaman
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T21:21:13Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T21:21:13Z
dc.date.issued2024-12-04
dc.identifier.isbn979-8-4007-0489-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/158064
dc.descriptionACM MobiCom ’24, November 18–22, 2024, Washington D.C., DC, USAen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates how an airborne node can eavesdrop on the underwater acoustic communication between submerged nodes. Conventionally, such eavesdropping has been assumed impossible as acoustic signals do not cross the water-air boundary. Here, we demonstrate that underwater acoustic communications signals can be picked up and (under certain conditions) decoded using an airborne mmWave radar due to the minute vibrations induced by the communication signals on the water surface. We implemented and evaluated a proof-of-concept prototype of our method and tested it in controlled (pool) and uncontrolled environments (lake). Our results demonstrate that an airborne device can identify the modulation and bitrate of acoustic transmissions from an uncooperative underwater transmitter (victim), and even decode the transmitted symbols. Unlike conventional over-the-air communications, our results indicate that the secrecy of underwater links varies depending on the modulation type and provide insights into the underlying reasons behind these differences. We also highlight the theoretical limitations of such a threat model, and how these results may have a significant impact on the stealthiness of underwater communications, with particular concern to submarine warfare, underwater operations (e.g., oil & gas, search & rescue, mining), and conservation of endangered species. Finally, our investigation uncovers countermeasures that can be used to improve or restore the stealthiness of underwater acoustic communications against such threats.en_US
dc.publisherACM|The 30th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networkingen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1145/3636534.3690663en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attributionen_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceAssociation for Computing Machineryen_US
dc.titleSURF: Eavesdropping on Underwater Communications from the Airen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationMollahosseini, Poorya, Afzal, Sayed Saad, Adib, Fadel and Ghasempour, Yasaman. 2024. "SURF: Eavesdropping on Underwater Communications from the Air."
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.departmentProgram in Media Arts and Sciences (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)en_US
dc.identifier.mitlicensePUBLISHER_CC
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaperen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2025-01-01T08:46:53Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderThe author(s)
dspace.date.submission2025-01-01T08:46:53Z
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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