RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic
Author(s)
Tan, Qinhan; Yang, Yuheng; Bourgeat, Thomas; Malik, Sharad; Yan, Mengjia
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Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous evaluation of the ability of hardware designs to deal with speculative execution attacks is urgently desired.
This paper proposes a formal verification technique called Contract Shadow Logic that can considerably improve RTL verification scalability with little manual effort while being applicable to different defense mechanisms. In this technique, we leverage computer architecture design insights to improve verification performance for checking security properties formulated as software-hardware contracts for secure speculation. Our verification scheme is accessible to computer architects and requires minimal formal-method expertise.
We evaluate our technique on multiple RTL designs, including three out-of-order processors. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique exhibits a significant advantage in finding attacks on insecure designs and deriving complete proofs on secure designs, when compared to the baseline and two state-of-the-art verification schemes, LEAVE and UPEC.
Description
ASPLOS ’25, March 30–April 3, 2025, Rotterdam, Netherlands
Date issued
2025-02-03Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer SciencePublisher
ACM|Proceedings of the 30th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 1
Citation
Qinhan Tan, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, and Mengjia Yan. 2025. RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic. In Proceedings of the 30th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 1 (ASPLOS '25). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 970–986.
Version: Final published version
ISBN
979-8-4007-0698-1
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