| dc.contributor.author | Pearson, Joshua Edward | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-10-22T17:07:59Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-22T17:07:59Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-07-27 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8205 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1933-1592 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163368 | |
| dc.description.abstract | I outline a novel counterexample to the principle ofbelief revision, Anticipation: if both learning 𝑒 andlearning not-𝑒 would render belief in 𝑝 unjustified, youcannot now be justified in believing 𝑝. If I am right,not only is the leading theory of belief revision false, soare various recently proposed weakenings. I develop anddefend a new theory that correctly predicts the failuresof Anticipation I argue for, predicated on the simpleidea that one is justified in ruling out possibility just incase that possibility is sufficiently improbable. | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70037 | en_US |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Attribution | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_US |
| dc.source | Wiley | en_US |
| dc.title | Belief revision revised | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Pearson, J. E. (2025). Belief revision revised. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 111, 696–727. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.relation.journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | en_US |
| dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
| dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
| eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.70037 | |
| dspace.date.submission | 2025-10-22T17:00:14Z | |
| mit.journal.volume | 111 | en_US |
| mit.journal.issue | 2 | en_US |
| mit.license | PUBLISHER_CC | |
