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dc.contributor.authorMizruchi, Mark S.
dc.contributor.authorChu, Johan S. G.
dc.date.accessioned2025-11-14T18:10:08Z
dc.date.available2025-11-14T18:10:08Z
dc.date.issued2025-04-09
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163661
dc.description.abstractIt is broadly accepted among political scientists, political sociologists, and social movement theorists that a unified group will have a higher probability of success than a group that experiences internal divisions or fragmentation. Similarly, it has been assumed that in a society with a relatively unified elite, the elite will experience disproportionately higher benefits relative to the larger population. We take issue with this claim. In the mid-twentieth century, large American corporations exhibited a relatively high level of unity but the relative economic benefits accruing to the elite were at historic lows. In more recent years, American big business has become increasingly fragmented, yet the economic benefits that these elites have received have reached historic highs, and the average American’s standard of living has stagnated. Drawing on Padgett and Ansell, we introduce the concept of inadvertent robust action to explain how a relatively fragmented, disorganized elite can reap benefits that exceed those that its more unified counterparts experienced in an earlier era. We conclude with a discussion of the conditions under which our formulation can be expected to hold.en_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-025-09617-3en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attributionen_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.titleThe power of fragmented elites: the role of inadvertent robust actionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationMizruchi, M.S., Chu, J.S.G. The power of fragmented elites: the role of inadvertent robust action. Theor Soc 54, 475–506 (2025).en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Managementen_US
dc.relation.journalTheory and Societyen_US
dc.identifier.mitlicensePUBLISHER_CC
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2025-07-18T15:31:25Z
dc.language.rfc3066en
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)
dspace.embargo.termsN
dspace.date.submission2025-07-18T15:31:25Z
mit.journal.volume54en_US
mit.licensePUBLISHER_CC
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Neededen_US


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