When competition becomes contagious: Strategic arms racing spillovers, alliance politics, and the Sino-American nuclear competition
Author(s)
Seitz, Samuel M.; Ji, Elliot S.
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The development of new conventional counterforce systems and improved missile defence systems enables non-nuclear states to directly influence the strategic nuclear balance. These dynamics increase the possibility of strategic arms racing spillovers, where arms racing in one dyad yields capabilities that threaten third parties’ arsenals and thus creates a type of security dilemma. It also increases the risk of non-nuclear allies entrapping their nuclear patrons in strategic arms racing. We illustrate this argument via the case of North and South Korea’s arms racing.
Date issued
2025-08-10Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Security Studies ProgramJournal
Journal of Strategic Studies
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Seitz, S. M., & Ji, E. S. (2025). When competition becomes contagious: Strategic arms racing spillovers, alliance politics, and the Sino-American nuclear competition. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1–23.
Version: Final published version
ISSN
0140-2390
1743-937X