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Bridging Utility Maximization and Regret Minimization
(2013-12-03)
We relate the strategies obtained by (1) utility maximizers who use regret to refine their set of undominated strategies, and (2) regret minimizers who use weak domination to refine their sets of regret-minimizing strategies.
A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions
(2012-09-07)
We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include ...
Optimal Parametric Auctions
(2012-05-08)
We study the problem of profit maximization in auctions of one good where the buyers' valuations are drawn from independent distributions. When these distributions are known to the seller, Myerson's optimal auction is a ...
Conservative-Bayesian Mechanisms
(2010-09-08)
We put forward a new class of mechanisms. In this extended abstract, we exemplify our approach only for single-good auctions in what we call a conservative-Bayesian setting. (Essentially, no common-knowledge about the ...
Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness
(2011-04-22)
Fifty years ago, Vickrey published his famous mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. The main property of Vickrey's mechanism is efficiency in dominant strategies. In absence of collusion, this is a ...
The Order Independence of Iterated Dominance in Extensive Games, with Connections to Mechanism Design and Backward Induction
(2012-07-31)
Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process ...
Multi-Unit Auction Revenue with Possibilistic Beliefs
(2017-06-05)
The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about ...
Optimal Parametric Auctions
(2012-06-14)
We study the problem of an auctioneer who wants to maximize her profits. In our model, there are n buyers with private valuations drawn from independent distributions F_1,...,F_n. When these distributions are known to the ...
Possibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationality
(2014-06-09)
We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ...
Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction
(2012-06-22)
In settings of incomplete information we put forward an epistemic framework for designing mechanisms that successfully leverage the players' arbitrary higher-order beliefs, even when such beliefs are totally wrong, and ...