A Social-Welfare Optimal Probabilistic Mechanism for Knightian Single-Good Auctions

Author(s)
Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen
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Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
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Abstract
We provide an optimal probabilistic mechanism for maximizing social welfare in single-good auctions when each player does not know his true valuation for the good, but only a set of valuations that is guaranteed to include his true one.
Date issued
2012-09-07
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72584
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2012-028
Keywords
Knightian Auctions, Probabilistic Mechanisms, Social Welfare
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