Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply

Author(s)
Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
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Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
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Abstract
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark.
Date issued
2008-12-02
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43946
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-073
Keywords
Single-good, unlimited-supply auctions, Resilient mechanism design, Provision of a public good, Knowledge-Based Benchmarks
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