| dc.contributor.advisor | Silvio Micali | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Jing | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Micali, Silvio | en_US |
| dc.contributor.other | Theory of Computation | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-12-16T19:15:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-12-16T19:15:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-12-02 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43946 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 3 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-072 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-073 | |
| dc.relation.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43716 | |
| dc.subject | Single-good, unlimited-supply auctions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Resilient mechanism design | en_US |
| dc.subject | Provision of a public good | en_US |
| dc.subject | Knowledge-Based Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.title | Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply | en_US |
