Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply

Author(s)
Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing
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Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
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Abstract
We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks.
Date issued
2008-12-17
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074
Keywords
Resilient mechanism design, Knowledge-Based Benchmarks, Player-Knowledge Benchmarks, Aggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarks, Aggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarks
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