| dc.contributor.advisor | Silvio Micali | |
| dc.contributor.author | Micali, Silvio | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Jing | en_US |
| dc.contributor.other | Theory of Computation | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2008-12-17T21:00:03Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-12-17 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43947 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We present various resilient auction mechanisms for a good in limited supply. Our mechanisms achieve both player-knowledge and aggregated player-knowledge benchmarks. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 3 p. | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-074 | |
| dc.subject | Resilient mechanism design | en_US |
| dc.subject | Knowledge-Based Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.subject | Player-Knowledge Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.subject | Aggregated Knowledge-Based Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.subject | Aggregated Player-Knowledge Benchmarks | en_US |
| dc.title | Resilient Auctions of One Good in Limited Supply | en_US |
