Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players
Author(s)
Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing![Thumbnail](/bitstream/handle/1721.1/49869/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061.pdf.jpg?sequence=4&isAllowed=y)
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Other Contributors
Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent.
Date issued
2009-12-04Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061
Keywords
rationally robust implementation, Virtual implementation, perfectly informed players