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Perfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Players

Author(s)
Micali, Silvio; Chen, Jing
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DownloadMIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061.pdf (197.5Kb)
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Theory of Computation
Advisor
Silvio Micali
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Abstract
We show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent.
Date issued
2009-12-04
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061
Keywords
rationally robust implementation, Virtual implementation, perfectly informed players

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