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dc.contributor.advisorSilvio Micali
dc.contributor.authorMicali, Silvioen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Jingen_US
dc.contributor.otherTheory of Computationen
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-09T21:15:08Z
dc.date.available2009-12-09T21:15:08Z
dc.date.issued2009-12-04
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49869
dc.description.abstractWe show that, when the players are perfectly informed about each other, essentially all social-choice functions can be rationally robustly implemented via an extensive-form public-action mechanism that (1) is perfectly robust against collusion, (2) requires only a linear number of computation steps and communication bits, and (3) preserves the privacy of the players' types to a very high extent.en_US
dc.format.extent4 p.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-CSAIL-TR-2009-061
dc.subjectrationally robust implementationen_US
dc.subjectVirtual implementationen_US
dc.subjectperfectly informed playersen_US
dc.titlePerfect and General Virtual Implementation For Perfectly Informed Playersen_US


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