MIT Libraries logoDSpace@MIT

MIT
View Item 
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Open Access Articles
  • MIT Open Access Articles
  • View Item
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Open Access Articles
  • MIT Open Access Articles
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through Confirmation Codes

Author(s)
Chaum, David; Carback, Richard T.; Clark, Jeremy; Essex, Aleksander; Popoveniuc, Stefan; Rivest, Ronald L.; Ryan, Peter Y. A.; Shen, Emily (Emily Huei-Yi); Sherman, Alan T.; Vora, Poorvi L.; ... Show more Show less
Thumbnail
DownloadChaum-2009-Scantegrity II_ End-.pdf (1.122Mb)
PUBLISHER_POLICY

Publisher Policy

Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.

Terms of use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity - from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally - by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scantegrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a selection with this pen makes legible an otherwise invisible preprinted confirmation code. Confirmation codes are independent and random for each potential selection on each ballot. To verify that their individual votes are recorded correctly, voters can look up their ballot serial numbers online and verify that their confirmation codes are posted correctly. The confirmation codes do not allow voters to prove how they voted. However, the confirmation codes constitute convincing evidence of error or malfeasance in the event that incorrect codes are posted online. Correctness of the final tally with respect to the published codes is proven by election officials in a manner that can be verified by any interested party. Thus, compromise of either ballot chain of custody or the software systems cannot undetectably affect election integrity. Scantegrity II has been implemented and tested in small elections in which ballots were scanned either at the polling place or centrally. Preparations for its use in a public sector election have commenced.
Date issued
2009-11
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/52547
Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Journal
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
Chaum, D. et al. “Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through Confirmation Codes.” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on 4.4 (2009): 611-627. © 2009 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Version: Final published version
Other identifiers
INSPEC Accession Number: 10978370
ISSN
1556-6013
Keywords
privacy, end-to-end verifiability, electronic voting, cryptography

Collections
  • MIT Open Access Articles

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

My Account

Login

Statistics

OA StatisticsStatistics by CountryStatistics by Department
MIT Libraries
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
MIT
Content created by the MIT Libraries, CC BY-NC unless otherwise noted. Notify us about copyright concerns.