Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz
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O'Neil-2009-Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz.pdf
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Author(s)
Talmadge, Elisabeth Rosem Caitlin
O'Neil, William D.
Date Issued
December 2009
Journal
International Security
Publisher
MIT Press
Citation
O'Neil, William D., and Caitlin Talmadge. “Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz.” International Security 33.3 (2009): 190-198. © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
To the Editors (William D. O’Neil writes):
Caitlin Talmadge’s analysis of the threat of Iranian action to close the Strait of Hormuz
is not only timely but provides many valuable insights.1 Several aspects of this complex
issue call out for further clarification, however. Costs of closure:
To begin, Talmadge should have put greater emphasis on the costs that Iran would almost
surely bear in the wake of any closure attempt. Unless the Iranians were able to
convince the world that it was an act essential for self-defense, closure would inflame
opinion widely against them. Closing the strait would be seen not only as a serious violation
of international norms but, worse yet, one that directly and significantly touched
the interests of most states, virtually making it a campaign of piracy. Even states ready
to accept Iran’s right to retaliate against some offense would and it hard to forgive a response
so indiscriminately damaging. Under these circumstances, the United States could have wide latitude for action.
U.S. leaders might well take the opportunity to leave Iran not only greatly impoverished
through a loss of oil revenues and massive destruction of critical infrastructure
but stripped of its naval and air defenses. U.S. forces would probably need to seize the
Iranian-held islands lying near the shipping lanes east of the strait, and they would not
likely be returned. Given the geographic isolation of the region near the strait from the
rest of Iran, it is even conceivable that this area might be held under occupation. And
the residue of suspicion and resentment against Iran would surely linger among those
who suffered losses from the closure, prompting support for a tight sanctions regime. In short, Iran would find itself essentially in the same position as Iraq after the 1991
Gulf War, if not worse. Such a prospect might sober even the most adventurous or desperate
of Iranian leaders.
Description
Published under the section: Correspondence.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.190
