dc.contributor.author | Acemoglu, Daron | |
dc.contributor.author | Ticchi, Davide | |
dc.contributor.author | Vindigni, Andrea | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-08T18:27:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-10-08T18:27:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-04 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2009-09 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1542-4766 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1542-4774 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/58990 | |
dc.description.abstract | A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive in?uence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely una¤ected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for ?ghting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | National Science Fundation (U.S.) | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | MIT Press | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2010.8.2-3.664 | en_US |
dc.rights | Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. | en_US |
dc.source | MIT Press | en_US |
dc.subject | civil wars | en_US |
dc.subject | commitment | en_US |
dc.subject | coups | en_US |
dc.subject | military | en_US |
dc.subject | political transitions | en_US |
dc.subject | political economy | en_US |
dc.title | Persistence of civil wars | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni. "Persistence of civil wars." Journal of the European Economic Association 2010 8:2-3, 664-676. © 2010 by the European Economic Association | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.contributor.approver | Acemoglu, Daron | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Acemoglu, Daron | |
dc.relation.journal | Journal of the European Economic Association | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Final published version | en_US |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dspace.orderedauthors | Acemoglu, Daron; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andrea | en |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 | |
mit.license | PUBLISHER_POLICY | en_US |
mit.metadata.status | Complete | |