dc.contributor.author | Medard, Muriel | |
dc.contributor.author | Zhao, Fang | |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, MinJi | |
dc.contributor.author | Lima, Luísa | |
dc.contributor.author | Koetter, Ralf | |
dc.contributor.author | Barros, Joao | |
dc.contributor.author | Kalker, Ton | |
dc.contributor.author | Han, Keesook J. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-03T21:12:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-03T21:12:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-06 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2009-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0733-8716 | |
dc.identifier.other | INSPEC Accession Number: 11325682 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/60373 | |
dc.description.abstract | Random linear network coding can be used in peer-to- peer networks to increase the efficiency of content distribution and distributed storage. However, these systems are particularly susceptible to Byzantine attacks. We quantify the impact of Byzantine attacks on the coded system by evaluating the probability that a receiver node fails to correctly recover a file. We show that even for a small probability of attack, the system fails with overwhelming probability. We then propose a novel signature scheme that allows packet-level Byzantine detection. This scheme allows one-hop containment of the contamination, and saves bandwidth by allowing nodes to detect and drop the contaminated packets. We compare the net cost of our signature scheme with various other Byzantine schemes, and show that when the probability of Byzantine attacks is high, our scheme is the most bandwidth efficient. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCR-0325496) (CNS-0627021) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego (U.S.) (Contract No. N66001-08-C-2013) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (Grant FA9550-06-1-0155) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Bae Systems National Security Solutions Inc. (subcontract #069145) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Luso-American Foundation | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | MIT-Portugal Program (Grant MIT-Pt / TS-ITS/0059/2008) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (Grant SFRH/BD/24718/2005) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | European Commission (Grant FP7-INFSO-ICT-215252 (N-Crave Project)) | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2010.100607 | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ | en_US |
dc.source | MIT web domain | en_US |
dc.title | On Counteracting Byzantine Attacks in Network Coded Peer-to-Peer Networks | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | MinJi Kim et al. “On counteracting Byzantine attacks in network coded peer-to-peer networks.” Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on 28.5 (2010): 692-702. © 2010, IEEE | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics | en_US |
dc.contributor.approver | Medard, Muriel | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Medard, Muriel | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Zhao, Fang | |
dc.contributor.mitauthor | Kim, MinJi | |
dc.relation.journal | IEEE journal on selected areas in communications | en_US |
dc.eprint.version | Author's final manuscript | |
dc.type.uri | http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle | en_US |
eprint.status | http://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed | en_US |
dspace.orderedauthors | Kim, MinJi; Lima, Luísa; Zhao, Fang; Barros, Joao; Medard, Muriel; Koetter, Ralf; Kalker, Ton; Han, Keesook | en |
dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4059-407X | |
mit.license | OPEN_ACCESS_POLICY | en_US |
mit.metadata.status | Complete | |