Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKremer, Michael
dc.contributor.authorOlken, Benjamin A.
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-15T14:07:12Z
dc.date.available2011-02-15T14:07:12Z
dc.date.issued2009-04
dc.identifier.issn1945-7782
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/60948
dc.description.abstractThis paper applies principles from evolutionary biology to the study of unions. We show that unions that implement the preferred wage and organizing policies of workers will be displaced in evolutionary competition by unions that either extract less from firms, allowing them to live longer, or spend more on union organizing, or both. This implies that unions with constitutional incumbency advantages that allow leaders to depart from members' preferences may have a selective advantage, allowing them to grow at the expense of unions lacking such provisions. Evidence from the history of American unions supports these predictions. (JEL A12, J51)en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.1.2.150en_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleA Biological Model of Unionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationKremer, Michael, and Benjamin A. Olken. 2009. "A Biological Model of Unions." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2): 150–75.© 2009 AEAen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.approverOlken, Benjamin A.
dc.contributor.mitauthorOlken, Benjamin A.
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economicsen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsKremer, Michael; Olken, Benjamin Aen
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1918-4631
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record