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dc.contributor.authorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.authorOzdaglar, Asuman E.
dc.contributor.authorParandehgheibi, Ali
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-18T21:06:59Z
dc.date.available2011-03-18T21:06:59Z
dc.date.issued2010-02
dc.date.submitted2009-09
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.issn1090-2473
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/61745
dc.description.abstractWe provide a model to investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation in large societies (conceptualized as networks of agents communicating with each other). Each individual holds a belief represented by a scalar. Individuals meet pairwise and exchange information, which is modeled as both individuals adopting the average of their pre-meeting beliefs. When all individuals engage in this type of information exchange, the society will be able to eff ectively aggregate the initial information held by all individuals. There is also the possibility of misinformation, however, because some of the individuals are \forceful," meaning that they influence the beliefs of (some) of the other individuals they meet, but do not change their own opinions. The paper characterizes how the presence of forceful agents interferes with information aggregation. Under the assumption that even forceful agents obtain some information (however infrequent) from some others (and additional weak regularity conditions), we first show that beliefs in this class of societies converge to a consensus among all individuals. This consensus value is a random variable, however, and we characterize its behavior. Our main results quantify the extent of misinformation in the society by either providing bounds or exact results (in some special cases) on how far the consensus value can be from the benchmark without forceful agents (where there is efficient information aggregation). The worst outcomes obtain when there are several forceful agents and forceful agents themselves update their beliefs only on the basis of information they obtain from individuals most likely to have received their own information previously.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipUnited States. Air Force Office of Scientific Researchen_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.005en_US
dc.rightsAttribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unporteden_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/en_US
dc.sourceMIT web domainen_US
dc.titleSpread of (mis)information in social networksen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationAcemoglu, Daron, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Ali ParandehGheibi. “Spread of (mis)information in social networks.” Games and Economic Behavior 70.2 (2010): 194-227.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.approverAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.mitauthorAcemoglu, Daron
dc.contributor.mitauthorOzdaglar, Asuman E.
dc.contributor.mitauthorParandehgheibi, Ali
dc.relation.journalGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsAcemoglu, Daron; Ozdaglar, Asuman; ParandehGheibi, Alien
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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