Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots
Author(s)
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua; Dynarski, Susan M.; Kane, Thomas J.; Pathak, Parag
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We use student assignment lotteries to estimate the effect of charter school attendance on
student achievement in Boston. We also evaluate a related alternative, Boston's pilot schools. Pilot schools have some of the independence of charter schools, but operate within the Boston Public School district and are covered by some collective bargaining provisions. Lottery estimates show large and significant score gains for charter students in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery estimates for pilot school students are mostly small and insignificant, with some significant negative effects. Charter schools with binding assignment lotteries appear to generate larger gains than other charters.
Date issued
2011-03Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of EconomicsJournal
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
President and Fellows of Harvard College
Citation
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila et al. "Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots." Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2011) 126(2): 699-748.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0033-5533
1531-4650