Experience and content
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The ‘content view’, in slogan form, is ‘Perceptual experiences have representational content’. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to ‘experiences’. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of ‘mid-level’ vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are partially vindicated, because perceptual error is due to false belief.
DepartmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Byrne, Alex. "Experience and content." The Philosophical Quarterly Volume 59, Issue 236, pages 429–451, July 2009
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