Monotonicity and Implementability

Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan; Monderer, Dov
Thumbnail
DownloadAshlagi_Monotonicity and.pdf (483.3Kb)
PUBLISHER_POLICY
Terms of use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
Date issued
2010-09
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63120
Department
Sloan School of Management
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
Econometric Society
Citation
Ashlagi, Itai et al. “Monotonicity and Implementability.” Econometrica 78.5 (2010) : 1749-1772.
Version: Author's final manuscript
ISSN
0012-9682
1468-0262
Collections